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INTRODUCTION 
Deliberation is one of the most important tasks in any arbitral 
procedure. It is therefore important to define the term “deliberation.” 
According to the Oxford Dictionary, this term indicates the process 
of carefully considering or discussing something. The term 
deliberation is broad; it does not indicate any specific stage of the 
proceedings.  
 
 * This lecture is an adaptation of an article presented by the lecturer in the 
GLOBAL REFLECTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMERCE AND DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION: LIBER AMICORUM IN HONOUR OF ROBERT BRINER 221 (Gerald 
Aksen ed., 2005). 
 ** Former Secretary General of the Court of Arbitration of the International 
Chamber of Commerce. 
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Thus, concerning arbitrator’s deliberation, it would be wrong to 
think that only the final award should be the subject of deliberation. 
The Tribunal’s obligation of deliberation is not limited to the issue of 
an award. In fact, most of the time the Arbitral Tribunal is obliged to 
take several procedural decisions before the case is ready to be 
decided.1 These decisions are also subject to deliberation no matter if 
they qualify as an award or merely as an act of procedural 
administration.  
Except in cases where the parties have conferred upon the 
President the power to act alone, the decisions of the Arbitral 
Tribunal are always preceded by a deliberation of its members. In 
practice, it rarely occurs that a President is authorized to decide 
alone, except to grant extensions of time or to rule on minor issues, 
especially during the hearing. Even when the parties grant such 
power to the President, they will often specify that this faculty has to 
be exercised after consulting the co-arbitrators, which itself amounts 
to requiring some form of deliberation. The above confirms that 
deliberation begins when the Arbitral Tribunal comes into action 
because, most of the time, the Arbitral Tribunal cannot act without 
previous deliberation.  
It is worth questioning the nature of deliberation. Initially, it has 
been suggested that deliberations were a right of the parties derived 
from their right to be heard and their right to equal treatment.2 As it 
has been rightly pointed out, this view seems incompatible with the 
requirement of independence of the arbitrators.3 
It has also been suggested that the arbitrator’s duty of deliberation 
is based on international public policy.4 This is undoubtedly the case, 
 
1.I.e. Decisions on jurisdiction, admissibility or prescription of the parties’ claims, 
the validity of the contract, the principle of responsibility. The question of whether 
or not these decisions have to be considered as simply preliminary decisions or as 
arbitral awards properly speaking is discussed in comparative law. Cf. PIERRE 
LALIVE, JEAN-FRANÇOIS POUDRET, & CLAUDE REYMOND, LE DRIOT DE 
L’ARBITRAGE ET INTERNATIONAL EN SUISSE 406-07 (1989). However, the fact that 
these decisions have to be subject to deliberation is widely accepted. 
 2. JEAN-FRANÇOIS POUDRET & SEBASTIEN BESSON, DRIOT COMPARE DE 
L’ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL 689 (2002). It is not certain that these two authors 
share the same opinion on this subject. 
 3. In this sense, FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 746 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999). 
 4. In this sense, M. DE BOISSÉSON, LE DROIT FRANÇAIS DE L’ARBITRAGE 
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not, as has been put forward by some commentators that the only 
purpose of deliberations is the observation of the rights of defense,5 
but rather because in the absence of deliberation, the decision would 
not be taken by the Tribunal but by one or two individuals abusing of 
the power conferred to them as members of the Tribunal.6  
In practice, the arbitrator’s deliberation is closely linked to the 
partiality or impartiality of the members of the Arbitral Tribunal. 
Unfortunately, partial arbitrators are more common than one might 
anticipate and, although they tend to be the exception, in particular 
with the progress of a true arbitral culture, when arbitrators 
deliberate, they must be conscious of this harsh reality to avoid 
disillusion of the Tribunal at the time of deliberation.7 
Thus, in the practice of arbitrator’s deliberation one can 
distinguish two types: harmonious deliberation and pathologic 
deliberation. This distinction has mainly a pedagogical purpose. In 
the practice of arbitration proceedings, it is often at an advanced 
stage of the proceedings that the President is able to make an opinion 
about the impartiality or the partiality of his or her colleagues. It is 
undeniable that some arbitrators are known to be assistants to the 
party that appointed them.8 On the other hand, there is an elite corps 
of international arbitrators whose reputation and independence is 
established already. Jan Paulson, in a remarkable article,9 invited 
every member of the arbitrator profession to join this group. An 
arbitrator who usually sits with either kind of arbitrator knows what 
to expect from each one of them, but except for these special 
 
INTERNE ET INTERNATIONAL 801 (1990); see also Phillippe Fouchard, Commentary 
on the Judgment of the Cour de Cassation, 2e Civ., January 28, 1981, 1982 REVUE 
DE L’ARBITRAGE 425 (1982). 
 5.  M. DE BOISSESON, supra note 4. 
 6. For this reason, it is hard to share the view of J.-F. Poudret and S. Besson, 
according to which when the arbitrator appointed by a party has no opportunity to 
participate in deliberations, the principle of equality of the parties is breached to 
the detriment of that party. Indeed, both parties have an identical right to the 
decision is taken by the Arbitral Tribunal conceived as a whole. 
 7. Compare, inter alia, Emmanuel Gaillard, Les manœuvres dilatoires des 
parties et des arbitres dans l’arbitrage commercial international, 1990 REVUE DE 
L’ARBITRAGE 756 (1990). 
 8. Jean-Denis Bredin, Retour au délibéré arbitral, in LIBER AMICORUM 
CLAUDE REYMOND 43-50 (2004). 
 9. Jean Paulsson, Ethics, Elitism, Eligibility, 14 J. INT’L ARB. 13 (1997).  
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circumstances, it is often during the procedure that arbitrators get to 
know each other beyond superficial relationships developed at 
arbitration conferences.  
The result thereof is that the so-called pathologic deliberation 
influences the general practice of deliberation. The duration of 
deliberations is extremely variable and most of the time it depends 
on the speed with which the arbitrators verify the impartiality of their 
colleagues. In exceptional circumstances this verification can be 
immediate, and generally occurs in cases where the arbitrators have 
sat together before. If this is not the case, the arbitrators, and 
especially the President will take precautions from the beginning of 
the procedure in order to avoid the risks of a pathologic deliberation, 
at least until he or she is convinced of the uselessness of these 
measures.10 This observation makes even more sense as it has been 
asserted that deliberation begins when the tribunal comes into 
action.11  
Thus, in general terms, deliberation — the one preceding the final 
award and that some purists might call strictly “deliberation”— is 
actually the final stage of ongoing relations between the members of 
the Arbitral Tribunal. Depending on the partiality or impartiality of 
the members of the Tribunal, it can be (I) pathologic or (II) 
harmonious.  
I. THE PATHOLOGIC DELIBERATION 
A deliberation can be qualified as being “pathologic” when an 
arbitrator (or even two arbitrators12) does not make decisions based 
 
 10. Claude Reymond, Le Président du Tribunal Arbitral, in ETUDES OFFERTES 
A PIERRE BELLET, 465-76 (Pierre Bellet ed., 1991). 
 11.  In this sense see ANDREAS REINER, HANDBUCH DER ICC- 
SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT 251-252 (1989); Reymond, supra note 10, at 478; 
Bredin, supra note 8, at 48. 
 12. To the extent that the President has no link with the parties, in principle it is 
not conceivable that he or she may adopt such an attitude. However, this situation 
should not be completely dismissed, given that the President can eventually take 
procedural measures taking into account only his or her own available time, either 
because he or she wishes to accelerate the procedure to get rid of it as soon as 
possible, or on the contrary, seeks to slow it up in favor of activities that can be 
considered more urgent. A case has been known where a President had insisted on 
a relatively late date for a hearing because he wanted to be at the place of 
arbitration for personal reasons at this specific date. 
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on an objective analysis of the issues submitted to the Tribunal but 
rather on a personal interest more or less disguised.  
Too often, the interest of the arbitrator is to favor the party that has 
appointed him, either by endorsing all those party’s positions or, 
more rarely, by suggesting creative and favorable solutions when he 
considers that such party is poorly advised by its counsel.  
Although both situations are harmful, the first of them can be 
considered as mere inaction while the second, more disloyal and 
more destructive of the integrity of the procedure, is clearly collusion 
between the arbitrator and the party. In this second case, the 
arbitrator plays a role of informant, regularly informing that party of 
the facts, actions, of concerns but especially of draft decisions of the 
Arbitral Tribunal. Worse still, it may happen that following the 
party’s interests, the arbitrator tries to delay the procedure purporting 
to have a busy schedule that prevents him or her from participating in 
the meetings or refusing to deliberate by correspondence or, more 
severely, by resigning.  
These are just classic examples of what may be called ‘arbitral 
terrorism’ because the partial arbitrator who commits such excesses 
has no other purpose but to obstruct the arbitration.  
In general terms, a pathologic deliberation entails two risks: (1) 
the breach of the principle of confidentiality of deliberations, and (2) 
the sabotage of the arbitration proceedings. 
A. THE BREACH OF THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF DELIBERATIONS  
As has been previously suggested, one cannot consider that the 
principle of equality of the parties is breached when an arbitrator 
appointed by one of the parties does not participate in deliberations. 
However, the breach of the confidentiality of deliberations in favor 
of one of the parties is clearly a breach of this principle, which is 
considered by some legislation as a general principle arising from 
procedural public policy.13 In fact, the party that has been informed 
by one of the arbitrators of the developments of the reasoning of the 
Arbitral Tribunal, of the questions arising inside the Tribunal, or of 
the strengths and weaknesses that arbitrators perceive from the 
 
 13. E.g., Société Fougerolle v. Société Procofrance, Cour d’appel de Paris, 
May 25, 1990, 1990 REVUE DE L’ARBITRAGE 892 (1990). 
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parties’ submissions, can improperly take advantage of the received 
information in order to adapt its procedural strategy accordingly. 
Therefore, this party may improperly be advantaged over its 
counterparty due to these leaks in information.  
When this kind of breach occurs after the closure of debates and 
before the issue of the award by the Arbitral Tribunal, it is equally or 
more harmful for the other party, since it confers on the informed 
party a privileged position in the search for an amicable solution to 
the dispute. The party informed by an insider within the Arbitral 
Tribunal that a certain amount is to be awarded to its counterparty 
will often make strong attempts to reach a settlement for an amount 
inferior to that which otherwise it would be condemned. This is the 
reason why the settlements that occur when the Tribunal has already 
made a decision and when the award is being drafted creates an 
unhealthy climate between the members of the Tribunal: two of the 
members inevitably suspect the third one to have participated in what 
can only be called fraud and unfortunately, most of the time, these 
suppositions are well founded.  
The fear of a possible breach of the principle of confidentiality by 
one of the members of the Tribunal is the source of a regrettable lack 
of spontaneity therein. When arbitrators are unsure of the impartiality 
of their colleagues, each of them refrains from discussing the merits 
of the case before it is absolutely necessary in order to make a final 
decision. In some cases, the arbitrators are not obliged to discuss the 
merits until the moment of deliberations of the final award. At this 
point, everyone is forced to reveal his or her opinions and propose 
possible solutions relying on the arguments used in order to support 
each solution. At this moment, the risk of a breach of the principle of 
confidentiality of deliberations is no longer avoidable, but at least the 
principle of equality of the parties has been respected so far in the 
procedure. If at this point the parties engage in settlement 
negotiations, even if they know that the final award is being 
deliberated and drafted, it is each party’s responsibility to assess the 
information provided by its counterparty and the risk of leakage by 
one of the members of the Tribunal.  
However, the damaging effects of this lack of spontaneity in the 
relationships between the arbitrators will be measured in the second 
part of this article, where the benefits of a harmonious deliberation 
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are highlighted, which may only happen when complete trust exists 
between the members of the Tribunal.  
In order to have a harmonious deliberation, the experienced 
arbitrators try to test the degree of impartiality of their colleagues as 
soon as possible, generally, from the beginning of the procedure. 
Thus, the President will try to test the arbitrators’ impartiality, and 
each arbitrator will try to test his or her co-arbitrator’s impartiality.  
In most arbitral procedures this observation period does not last 
very long: usually since the first meeting of the arbitral tribunal with 
the parties whose purpose is to organize the procedure and, under 
ICC arbitration, since the signature of the terms or reference, it is 
possible to recognize if deliberations are going to be pathologic or 
harmonious. Indeed, if one of the arbitrators or both of them adopt 
without hesitation the procedural position of the party that has 
appointed them, without objectively and rationally assessing such 
positions, one can expect that deliberations will be pathologic. On 
the contrary, if the co-arbitrators make constructive proposals, taking 
into account the nature of the problems to be resolved, the 
atmosphere inside the Tribunal quickly relaxes because each of the 
members begin to form the impression of belonging to a 
homogeneous jurisdiction whose sole purpose is to join efforts in 
order to reach an impartial solution.  
However, this first impression may not match with reality, as some 
partial but experienced arbitrators, perfectly distinguishing between 
the accessory character of certain procedural confrontations and 
some more important issues with effects on the merits of the case, 
may not adopt the position of the party who appointed them at this 
first stage of the proceedings and rather reserve their partiality for 
substantial issues. Nevertheless, this situation rarely occurs and in 
order to benefit from the advantages of the harmonious deliberations, 
their colleagues will have the natural tendency to uphold the 
presumption of good faith in light of the positive results of this 
preliminary survey. Although the risk of leaks in information is less 
important, it is recommended not to commence dialogue on the 
merits at this stage of the procedure because this information may be 
used to the detriment of one of the parties. If after this first part of the 
procedure the co-arbitrators continue to demonstrate the same degree 
of impartiality, the harmonious deliberation may be considered as 
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acquired; otherwise, it is better to bear in mind the aforementioned 
precautions.  
B. SABOTAGE OF THE ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS  
The second risk arising from a pathologic deliberation is that the 
President cannot count on the participation of his or her colleagues to 
draft the award. In fact, if the President chooses to distribute the 
work among members of the Tribunal in order to allow that each 
arbitrator drafts one part of the award, there is a risk that the product 
of that work is useless. If, on the contrary, the President chooses to 
hold a meeting prior to discussion, which generally occurs and 
whose purpose is to question the co-arbitrators on their respective 
positions, he or she can conclude that the decisions cannot be taken 
by mutual agreement but by majority or only by him or herself. This 
situation is not dangerous per se. What becomes really dangerous is 
that, irrespective of the method used, once the positions of the 
arbitrators are known they then crystallize. From that moment on, the 
arbitration procedure is exposed to the risk mentioned above, i.e. 
arbitral terrorism. Indeed, although some arbitration rules allow the 
award to be made by majority or by the President only,14 the 
procedure can still be blocked by the resignation of one of the 
arbitrators, since the award is not completely drafted at this stage of 
the procedure.15 A deliberation on the final text of the award is 
necessary in order to complete deliberations and this necessity is, as 
it has been rightly pointed out,16 the “Achilles heel of the collegiate 
jurisdiction.”  
It is recommended to every President of an Arbitral Tribunal, 
conscious of the possibility of having a pathologic deliberation, to set 
a meeting for deliberation where he or she submits a draft decision 
and discusses with the co-arbitrators its content page by page, 
discussing each point subject to a decision and submitting to vote not 
only the content of the decision but also the text of the document. 
The Minutes of this meeting must be kept showing each vote. It is 
 
 14.  As is the case of ICC Arbitration Rules, Article 25(1). 
 15. Solutions such as that embodied in article 12 (5) of the ICC Rules, which, 
under some conditions, allows the two remaining arbitrators to issue the award 
cope with this problem. 
 16. Cf. Dominique Hascher, Principes et pratique de procédure dans 
l’arbitrage commercial international, 179 RCADI 51, 162 (1999).  
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true that these procedures constitute extra work for the President but 
collegiality must not be sacrificed for efficiency. For this reason, the 
interest to reach a decision shall not prevail over the duty of 
deliberation. The confrontation of ideas, even with a partial 
arbitrator, is always beneficial. Most times, it gives the President an 
opportunity to reinforce the motivation he or she wished to adopt in 
view of opposite considerations. Sometimes, the deliberation led to 
the change of his or her initial position on certain points, especially 
when one of the co-arbitrators is truly independent; that is to say, in 
most cases. More importantly, the President must not to forget that in 
a complex case, a co-arbitrator, even if partial, can be right about 
some points and at the same time refuse to acknowledge that the 
party that appointed him or her has no valid grounds behind other 
points. For this reason, deliberation must not be underestimated, but 
the President has to be aware of its limits. When the two co-
arbitrators are partial, which is quite rare, deliberations result in 
different majorities concerning each claim, because each arbitrator 
will make the decision that most favors the party that appointed him 
or her. In these cases, the President shall decide alone, when it is so 
allowed by the arbitration rules applicable to the case. Nevertheless, 
this is quite exceptional, because the President will try to persuade 
the co-arbitrators in order to make a collegiate decision.  
Whatever the case is, the point is not to conclude the deliberation 
session without having an agreed draft of the award that is the result 
of the vote of the members of the Tribunal. When the complexity of 
the case requires devoting several days for deliberation, the President 
must not hesitate to do so in order to have, at the end of deliberation, 
a draft of the award that has been completely voted by all members 
of the Tribunal. When this is done, the terrorist arbitrators are 
considerably limited in their attempts to jeopardize the procedure.  
II. THE HARMONIOUS DELIBERATION 
In general terms, one can say that harmony exists whenever there 
is an absolute trust between the members of the Arbitral Tribunal. 
This trust is simply the consequence of the impartiality of the 
members of the Tribunal. When the members of the Tribunal are 
absolutely impartial, harmony flows naturally.  
Once (1) it has been determined that a deliberation can be 
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qualified as being harmonious, (2) one should concentrate on the 
risks of this kind of deliberation, and (3) finally address the issue of 
the deliberation by the sole arbitrator.  
A. THE DEFINITION AND FORM OF HARMONIOUS DELIBERATION 
It is not easy to define harmonious deliberation because no two 
harmonious deliberations are ever the same. When the members of 
the Arbitral Tribunal know each other and appreciate each other, the 
harmony is gained from the time the Tribunal is established. In this 
case, the arbitrators do not hesitate to share their views of the case 
over telephone conversations or whenever they meet, whether in 
arbitral proceedings or in other circumstances. These exchanges are 
extremely rich because they allow each member’s views to form and 
become stronger. However, without being overly formalistic, the 
President must nevertheless make sure that any significant comment 
on the conduct of the proceedings and a fortiori on the merits of the 
case expressed in an informal conversation between two members of 
the Tribunal is immediately shared with the third member. Besides 
this particular situation, harmony within the Arbitral Tribunal 
develops gradually, just as the sound of an orchestra is formed only 
after each musician plays a few isolated musical syllables to tune his 
or her instrument to that of others. 
However, harmony should not be confused with unison. In 
international matters, arbitrators often belong to different legal 
traditions. One consequence of this is that each arbitrator may have 
different views not only on the conduct of the proceedings but also in 
the analysis of contractual provisions. In addition, arbitrators may 
have a different perception of business relationships or of human 
relations. Moreover, a harmonious deliberation is not a deliberation 
dominated by a permanent unanimity: it is not necessary that the 
members of the Tribunal belong to the same legal system to have the 
same conception about the conduct of the proceedings or about the 
solution of the dispute. There are confrontations even under 
harmonious deliberation, sometimes very difficult confrontations. 
But the difference between pathologic and harmonious deliberation 
is that in the latter, the differences of opinions between the arbitrators 
are the result of personal convictions by each of them and not simply 
the reflection of the position of the parties. It would be wrong to 
believe that harmonious deliberation always leads to agreements 
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between the members of the Tribunal, although in most cases the 
award is unanimous. Indeed, this unanimity may be just a façade, 
because it may be that the decision has been taken by majority, but 
the dissenting arbitrator may consider that it is not useful to inform 
the parties of his or her disagreement. This situation suggests that 
harmonious deliberations may also entail some risks. 
B. RISKS OF HARMONIOUS DELIBERATION 
When the decision is taken by majority despite the disagreement 
of one of the members of the Tribunal, the fact that this arbitrator 
does not wish to publicly express his or her opposition to the solution 
adopted by the majority of the arbitral tribunal does not pose a 
problem in itself. Moreover, this is consistent with the tradition of 
some countries where the Tribunal is considered as an entity rather 
than a sum of individuals. However, this interest not to reveal to the 
parties the differences of opinions among the arbitrators should not 
be transformed, in the name of harmony, into a desire to find at any 
price a solution that will satisfy all the members of the Tribunal. 
Indeed, arbitrators shall make the decision imposed by the law or by 
fairness, if they are to act as amiables compositeurs. This duty must 
prevail over any other concern. The arbitrators’ duty is to render 
justice and not to please one and other. If two arbitrators are unable 
to convince the third of the validity of the solution proposed by them 
and the error of his or her position, the majority must prevail and no 
haggling to reach unanimity is acceptable. The deliberation is not a 
negotiation.  
Contrary to pathologic deliberation, the harmonious deliberation 
does not require the President to take special precautions regarding 
the procedure for making a collegiate decision. In most cases, this 
procedure is defined during the proceedings. As noted, the position 
of each member of the Arbitral Tribunal is outlined during informal 
discussions, and they develop with the reading of the parties’ 
submissions and especially during the hearing of some witnesses 
and, sometimes, of experts. During the proceedings, the arbitrators 
have discussed the key issues raised by the case and, at the end of the 
proceedings; they are superficially familiar with the other’s 
respective viewpoints. On this basis, and after a discussion in which 
the positions of each arbitrator is confirmed and deepened, the 
President may then easily propose to the co-arbitrators a working 
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method that can vary according to various elements: identity or 
diversity of viewpoints inside the Tribunal, workload of each of the 
members, interest of either of them in a particular issue, etc. In a 
complex case, the President may establish a list of questions that 
each arbitrator may answer or split between them the drafting of the 
award. However, it is more common, and probably more desirable so 
as to have a unity of style, that the President prepares a draft of the 
award alone, even if one or several notes of the co-arbitrators are 
incorporated later into the original draft. In these cases, a further 
meeting is rarely necessary because refining the text of the award 
may be carried out by correspondence or during a conference call.  
C. THE DELIBERATION BY THE SOLE ARBITRATOR  
These few reflections on arbitrator’s deliberation cannot be 
concluded without talking of the most harmonious, but especially the 
most difficult form of deliberation: the deliberation by the sole 
arbitrator. If the deliberation is the conscious and thoughtful 
examination of the case before deciding whether to perform or not an 
act conceived as possible, there is no doubt that the sole arbitrator, in 
his or her solitude, deliberates. However, caution should bear borne 
here also as this process involves its own dangers. The absence of 
confrontation does not only entail the risk of prejudging but also the 
risk of being superficial. Indeed, the member of an Arbitral Tribunal 
who has to convince the other members of the validity of his or her 
analysis is obliged to examine all aspects of the case to find the 
evidence and arguments that support his or her position. The sole 
arbitrator must act in the same way in order to properly fulfill its 
mission; the problem is that it is only the desire to act in this way that 
will force him or her to do so. The sole arbitrator must adopt the 
perspective of each party and evaluate in light of each of them, the 
possibility to make an award that satisfies the law, or, where 
appropriate, equity. However, this task is far from being easy and the 
sole arbitrator should not rely too much on help from associates or 
relatives to fulfill this obligation. Indeed, they do not have sufficient 
knowledge of the case to have a totally independent view, and their 
view is always influenced by the sole arbitrator’s view, which is 
necessarily based on its first impressions. For this reason, the sole 
arbitrator shall, under no circumstance, be tempted to escape from 
his or her isolation.  
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CONCLUSION 
These observations on the deliberation of the sole arbitrator lead to 
the conclusion that a collegiate deliberation, whether harmonious or 
pathologic, must always coordinate with the personal deliberation of 
each member of the Arbitral Tribunal. For this reason, before 
confronting each arbitrator’s analysis with those of his or her 
colleagues, an arbitrator must have his own internal deliberation and 
must analyze the arguments of each party with the greatest open-
mindedness. Thus, the arbitrator must do so by assuming in turn that 
the party which he or she examines the theory is right. Once both 
positions have been properly analyzed he or she may make a 
decision, while recognizing that this decision is tentative, as an 
arbitrator must debate with his or her colleagues before making a 
final decision.  
 
 
 
